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Freedom of Association and NGO Law: The Constitutionality of the 2009 







Freedom of Association is entrenched in the Zambian Constitution and in several 
International Law instruments to which Zambia is a party. By hindering the independent 
and effective operations of NGOs, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act of 2009 
unjustifiably curtails this freedom.  This paper examines the NGO Act and documents the 
various instances in which it imposes an unconstitutional, unjustifiable and 
disproportionate hindrance on the ability of NGOs to operate effectively. It argues that the 
Act threatens to roll back the enormous gains that NGOs have made and continue to make 





In 2009 The Zambian Government enacted the Non-Governmental Organizations Act 
(NGO) No. 16 of 2009.7 The Act created the NGO Board whose function is to consider and 
approve applications for registration from NGOs. The Act requires all NGOs formed after 
the passing of the Act to register with the said Board, and those in existence prior to the 
enactment of the Act to apply for a certificate of registration. The Act gives broad discretion 
to the Government to deny registration to NGOs, powers to dictate NGOs’ thematic and 
geographical areas of work and imposes mandatory re-registration every five years in 
contravention of international human rights treaties, best practices and standards. In this 
article, we argue that the NGO Act of 2009 is unconstitutional and violates both the 1996 
Zambian constitution and numerous provisions pertaining to freedom of association of 
international treaties and conventions, to which Zambia is a party and is therefore 
obligated to abide by. It is also in breach of well-established international best practices. 
The Act is clearly intended to curtail the freedom of NGOs in Zambia to operate 
independently and effectively. If implemented, it will without doubt hobble their 
operations. 
NGOs, both domestic and international, are an indispensable component in the 
functioning of a democratic state and in the effective promotion of human rights, the rule of 
law and good governance. Their contributions are important in relation to fact finding, 
reporting, standard setting and the overall promotion, implementation, and enforcement of 
human rights and citizens’ participation in governance. NGOs operate on the basis of 
                                                          
7 Non-Governmental Organizations Act, No. 16 of 2009.  
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differing mandates, each responding to its own individual priorities and methods of action, 
bringing a range of viewpoints to issues that arise in governance. In addition, they promote 
accountability in governance. From the earliest times, they have played a key role in 
protecting human rights, human dignity, and human progress. One of the oldest and most 
well-known NGOs is the Anti-Slavery Society, founded in 1823. It is well-known for its 
campaign to rid the world of the slave trade (Davies, 1966). Another well-known example 
is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. Established initially by six NGOs, the 
campaign was awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its contribution to the 
adoption of the 1997 Mina Ban Treaty. Further, NGOs’ significant role in the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court is well recognized (see Glasius, 2006). Yet another 
example is the Kimberly Certification Scheme. This is an international diamond 
certification system established in 2003 that focuses on stopping the trade in conflict 
diamonds.8 
 Whatever the shortcomings, it is inconceivable that the progress made thus far in 
establishing democracy and accountability for governance throughout the world and in 
Zambia could have been achieved without the work of NGOs. An important condition for 
the existence of a democratic society is the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms 
enshrined in a national constitution. Freedom of association is a cornerstone for a 
functioning democracy. The right to form groups, to organize and to assemble together 
with the aim of addressing issues of common concern is a human right. The ability to 
organize is an important means by which citizens can influence their governments and 
leaders. The right of association not only applies to individuals who wish to form 
associations but also guarantees associations so formed the right to operate freely and 
without interference. It is important that government creates an environment that allows 
associations to flourish, rather than enacting draconian laws that claw back and impose 
unnecessary restrictions on the enjoyment of the freedom of association. 
 
2. Freedom of Association: Basis and Scope 
 
In this section we will analyze the international instruments that entrench freedom of 
association and the court jurisprudence interpreting these instruments by both domestic 
and international tribunals. Zambia, like all state parties to these instruments, has the 
prime responsibility to promote, protect and implement human rights and fundamental 
freedoms articulated by the conventions Zambia is party to. The freedom of association is 
guaranteed by a number of international, regional and national constitutions.9 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 provides per Article 20(1) that ‘Everyone has 
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.’ It provides further that ‘No one 
                                                          
8   http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-diamond (accessed 21 November 
2013). 
9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, The International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are examples of international conventions that 
guarantee the freedom of association in democratic societies. The European Convention on Human 
Rights, The American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights are examples of regional arrangements that guarantee the freedom of association. 
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may be compelled to belong to an association.’ The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights provides per Article 22(1) that: ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection 
of his interests.’ Whilst guaranteeing the freedom of association, international conventions 
recognize that the freedom is not absolute and may be interfered with or derogated from 
under limited circumstances. The circumstances under which freedom may be interfered 
with are carefully and strictly circumscribed by law and once the requirements are not met, 
the continued interference becomes an impermissible violation of freedom, actionable 
before the courts. 
International human rights treaties are replete with provisions that guarantee the 
freedom of association. Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.’ Article 11(2) provides that:  
 
No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
 
Article 11(2) of the European Convention sets out the conditions under which the freedom 
may be limited under the European Convention. In Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov 
v. Azerbaijan (2009)10 (hereinafter referred to as TMC case), The European Human Rights 
Court held that ‘… an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it was 
‘prescribed by law’, pursued one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2 and was 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the achievement of those aims.’ All three conditions 
must be fulfilled cumulatively or the implied restriction will be considered in violation of 
the Convention (Guluzade et al., 2010). Thus though the freedom of association is not 
absolute, the law set a very high standard allowing a limited scope of permissible intrusion. 
 The expressions “prescribed by law” require that there must be a domestic law that 
is precise and accessible to everyone in the country.11 The expression also refers to the 
quality of the law in question.12 Thus in the TMC case the court held that:  
 
The expressions ‘prescribed by law’ and “in accordance with the law” 
in Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention not only require that the 
impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also 
refer to the quality of the law in question. The law should be 
accessible to the persons concerned and formulated with sufficient 
precision to enable them – if need be, with appropriate advice – to 
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the 
consequences which a given action may entail (see, among many 
                                                          
10 (Application no. 37083/03) 
11 Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov V. Azerbaijan (Application no. 37083/03) p. 14. 
12 Ibidem. 
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other authorities, Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 
2004‑ I). 
 
Domestic legislation aimed at limiting the freedom must also provide a level of protection 
against arbitrary interference by government officials, since it would be contrary to the 
rule of law to grant an unfettered discretion to the executive.13 The law must therefore 
spell out the scope of any discretion and how it is to be exercised by the executive.14 The 
expression ‘necessary in a democratic society’ is to be construed strictly and interference 
under it is permissible only where the interference corresponds to a pressing social need, 
but not construed broadly to encompass a regulation that is merely useful or desirable.15 
The African Charter of Human and People Rights provides in Article 10(1) that: ‘every 
individual shall have the right to free association provided that he abides by the law.’ 
Article 10(2) provides that: ‘Subject to the obligation of solidarity provided for in 29 no one 
may be compelled to join an association.’ In Lawyers for Human Rights v Swaziland, citing 
Huri-Laws v Nigeria (2000) AHRLR 273 (ACHPR 2000), the African Commission, quoting 
its Resolution on the Right to Freedom of Association, held that:  
 
the regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association 
should be consistent with states’ obligations under the African 
Charter and in regulating the use of this right, the competent 
authorities should not enact provisions which would limit the 
exercise of this freedom and that the competent authorities should 
not override constitutional provisions or undermine fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the constitution and international standards.  
 
Flowing from this decision, state parties are obliged to regulate freedom of association in a 
manner that is consistent with the charter and not to limit the right, to regulate the 
freedom in a manner not to override constitutional guarantees and international treaties. 
Generally, international and regional bodies guard jealously the freedom of association as a 
fundamental right allowing official interference only under limited and prescribed 
circumstances. 
 The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders adopted on 9 December 
1998 declared: ‘Everyone has the right to promote and strive for the protection and 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’ The declaration states that this 
right may be enjoyed ‘individually and in association with others’. The Declaration 
emphasizes the fact that human rights defenders are entitled to their rights both as 
individuals and as members of any group, association, or non-governmental organization. 
The Human Rights Committee in General Comment No.25 observed that the freedom of 
association includes the right to form and join organizations and associations concerned 
with political and public affairs.  
 Under the United Nations Charter, member states are obligated to promote 
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. A state that is party to human rights 
                                                          
13 Ibidem. 
14 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000‑XI). 
15 Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov V. Azerbaijan (Application no. 37083/03) p. 16. 
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treaties is furthermore under a legal obligation to ensure the rights articulated in the 
treaties to all individuals under its jurisdiction, and to provide for an effective remedy in 
case of a violation. In Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras (Inter-Am. Ct (ser.c) No.4) the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that when states join treaties they undertake 
to respect the rights and freedoms recognized in the treaties. States assume the following 
obligations: (a) to respect the rights and freedoms recognized in the treaties; (b) to ensure 
free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the treaties to every person subject to 
their jurisdiction. This obligation implies the duty of states to organize the governmental 
apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so 
that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights 
and (c) states must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized 
by the treaties.      
 
2.1 Freedom of Association in the Zambian Constitution 
 
The Zambian Constitution as Amended by Act No. 18 of 1996 echoes the determination of 
the people to establish a sovereign democratic state and promises the freedom of 
association to all citizens. Article 21(1) of the Zambian Constitution as Amended by Act No. 
18 of 1996 provides that:  
 
Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the 
enjoyment of his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, 
his right to assemble freely and associate with other persons and in 
particular to form or belong to any political party, trade union or 
other association for the protection of his interests.  
 
The constitution guarantees every citizen the freedom to associate with any person with 
the view to protecting and promoting their interest. Flowing from this provision, the 
freedom is only to be curtailed with the consent of the individual.  
Article 21(2) of the constitution further provides that:  
 
Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the 
extent that it is shown that the law in question makes provision: (a) 
that is reasonably required in the interests of defense, public safety, 
public order, public morality or public health; (b) that is reasonably  
required for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of 
other persons; (c) that  imposes restrictions upon public officers; or 
(d) for the registration of political parties or trade unions in a 
register established by or under a law and for imposing reasonable 
conditions relating to the procedure for entry on such register 
including conditions as to the minimum number of persons 
necessary to constitute a trade union qualified for registration; and 
except so far as that provision or, the thing done under the authority 
thereof as the case may be, is shown not to be reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society.  
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Article 21(2) introduces a limitation to the absolute enjoyment of the freedom. Thus 
without the consent of the individual the state may enact laws that seek to do a list of 
things aimed at interfering with the absolute enjoyment of the freedom. However, these 
laws must conform to a standard set by the constitution itself. The standard as interpreted 
by the courts being that the law must be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society and 
fall under the permitted exceptions under the constitution. This standard is akin to the 
standard espoused in Tebieti Mühafize Cemiyyeti and Israfilov v. Azerbaijan and Lawyers 
for Human Rights v Swaziland (ACHPR 2000).  
 
 
3. The NGO Act of 2009: A closer look 
 
The Non-Governmental Organizations’ Act, No. 16 of 2009 of Zambia, according to its 
preamble, provides for the co-ordination and registration of non-governmental 
organizations; the establishment of the Non-Governmental Organization’s Board and the 
Zambia Congress of Non-Governmental Organizations; the constitution of the Council of 
Non-Governmental Organizations; and the provision for matters connected with or 
incidental to the foregoing. The implementation of this law has a significant impact on the 
enjoyment of the freedom of association by individuals who seek to establish non-
governmental organizations for the promotion and protection of their interest in the 
country. Thus the provisions of the law must be carefully matched against the enjoyment of 
the freedom to ascertain whether it unjustifiably interferes with same. 
 
3.1 Self-Regulation of Non-Governmental Organizations 
 
Part V of the NGOs Act deals with self-regulation of NGOs registered under the Act. The Act 
establishes a Zambia Congress of Non-Governmental Organizations which shall be a 
collective forum of all organizations registered under the Act.16 The Congress adopts its 
own structures, rules and procedures for its administration.17 In addition to this, the 
Congress elects a twelve member Council which shall be responsible for the management 
of the affairs of the Congress.18 The Council is mandated to develop, adopt and administer a 
code of conduct for NGOs, facilitate and coordinate the work of NGOs operating in the 
country and perform other functions assigned by the Congress.19 The law provides further 
that for the purposes of developing a code of conduct for the operation of NGOs, the first 
twelve NGOs to be registered under the law shall comprise an interim council competent to 
develop the Code of Conduct for NGOs in the country.20  
Flowing from the provisions of the Act, after going through all the mandatory 
registration requirements under the law, an NGO is compelled to join the collective forum 
called the Congress. It is not clear who will finance the activities of the Congress created 
                                                          
16 Section 29(1) of Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2009. 
17 Section 29(2) of Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2009. 
18 Section 30(1)(2) of Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2009. 
19 Section 31(a)(b) and (c) of Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2009. 
20 Section 34 of Non-Governmental Organizations Act, 2009. 
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under the law and the subsequent Council the Congress is tasked to elect.21 The provisions 
of Part V must be subject to scrutiny because they compel all registered NGOs to form an 
association called the Congress. The law does not offer a choice whether to join or not. The 
freedom to associate has been held to mean the freedom to dissociate.22 As it is indicated 
above, Article 20 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights mandates that no one can 
be compelled to join an association. According to Article 10(2) of the African Charter no 
one may be compelled to join an association. Moreover, it is a well-established principle of 
the European Court of Human Rights that the freedom not to associate is part and parcel of 
the freedom of association. In a case that is now regarded a leading authority of the 
European human rights law, Young, James and Webster v. The UK, the European Court on 
Human Rights discussed whether article 11 of the European Convention included a 
“negative right” not to be compelled to join an association. The Court held that the 
dismissals of the applicants as a result of their refusal to join a trade union represented a 
form of compulsion incompatible with the freedom of association guaranteed by the 
European Human Rights Convention.23 To be able to compel NGOs to enter into a forum 
without giving them the option of leaving, the government must provide reasonable 
justification to satisfy the constitutional test since it is an interference going against the 
individual consent requirement under the constitution. 
Compelling people or a group of people to join an association is frowned upon even 
if the initiative was at the instant of those compelled. In New Patriotic Party V. Attorney-
General,24 the plaintiff brought an action before the Ghanaian Supreme Court for a 
declaration that: (1) the Council of Indigenous Business Associations Law, 1993 (PNDCL 
312)(CIBA) was inconsistent with and a contravention of articles 21(1)(e), 35(1) and 
37(2)(a) and (3) of the Constitution, 1992 and consequently void.25 The Attorney-General 
contended, inter alia, on the merits that since PNDCL 312 had been enacted upon, the 
petition of the associations specified in the schedule to the Law to enable them to freely 
operate under the umbrella of a council similar to the Trades Union Congress, it was not in 
breach of their right to form or join any association of their choice under articles 21(e) and 
37(2) (a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that:  
 
                                                          
21 It may be that the fees and remuneration of the members of the Council or the interim council 
under the law will invariably be borne by the NGOs and not the government.  
22 New Patriotic Front v Attorney General [1997-98] 1 GLR 378 – 461 at 382. 
23 Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 7601/77, 13 August, 1981, para.55. 
24 [1997-98] 1 GLR 378 – 461. 
25 Article 21 provides 21. (1) All persons shall have the right to- ... 
(e) freedom of association. which shall include freedom to form or join trade unions or other 
associations, national and international, for the protection of their interest ... 
Article 37 (2) provides: The State shall enact appropriate laws to assure- 
(a) the enjoyment of rights of effective participation in deve-lopment processes including rights of 
people to form their own associations free from state interference and to use them to promote and 
protect their interests in relation to development processes. rights of access to agencies and 
officials of the State necessary in order to realize effective participation in development processes; 
free-dom to form organizations to engage in self-help and income generating projects; and freedom 
to raise funds to support those activities. 
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…in testing the constitutionality of any law, the court should not 
concern itself with the propriety or expediency of the impugned law, 
but with what the law itself provided. Accordingly, the fact that the 
organizations in section 4 of the Schedule to PNDCL 312 themselves 
had requested the enactment of that Law would not obviate the 
necessity for the requirement that the Law should pass the 
constitutional test.  
 
The court held further that provisions contained in sections, 3(b) and 4 of PNDCL 312 were 
unconstitutional and would be struck down as null and void because: 
 
…the organizations listed under section 4 of the Schedule were 
composed of individual persons with rights of freedom of 
association. Freedom of association meant freedom of people to 
voluntarily join together to form an association for the protection of 
their interests free from state interference. However, that freedom 
was effectively taken away, in the instant case, by the compulsion of 
the stated organizations to join CIBA under section 4 of PNDCL 312 
which was not a regulatory law permitted under the Constitution, 
1992. Since coercion implied some negation of choice and 
voluntariness, section 4 offended against article 21(e) and 37(2) (a) 
of the Constitution, 1992. Furthermore, since the freedom to 
associate implied the right to dissociate, the failure to provide the 
manner of leaving CIBA by the registered associations, took away the 
freedom of the concerned members to freely associate with others in 
violation of article 21 (e) of the Constitution, 1992.  
 
What matters is that the law which follows as a result of a request or petition must satisfy 
constitutional standards. Therefore if government has sufficient reasons to interfere in the 
enjoyment of the freedom it must do so without contravening the Zambian constitution, the 
African Charter and other treaties it has joined. Article 21(2) of the 1996 Zambian 
Constitution provides that:  
 
Nothing  contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent  with or in contravention of this Article to the 
extent that it is shown that the law in  question makes provision: 
…(d) for the registration of political parties or trade unions in a 
register established by or under a law and for imposing reasonable 
conditions relating to the procedure for entry on such register 
including conditions as to the minimum number of persons 
necessary to constitute a trade union qualified for registration; and 
except so far as that provision or, the thing done under the authority 
thereof as the case may be, is shown not to be reasonably justifiable 
in a democratic society.  
 
The exception applies to political parties and trade unions. Section 2 of the NGOs Act 
provides that the law does not apply to political parties and trade unions. Therefore the 
Article 21(2) (d) exception does not apply to NGOs. Assuming it did, the requirement for 
limiting the freedom will still not be met since the exception pertains to setting 
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preconditions for registration of an association, but not necessarily post-registration 
restrictions as seen under the NGOs Act, since being a member of the Congress is not a 
precondition for registration by the Board.  
 Compelling NGOs to form the Congress has not been shown to be reasonably 
required in the interests of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or public 
health, or for the purpose of protecting the rights or freedoms of other persons. It has not 
been shown that democracy in Zambia will be in danger for which reason government must 
interfere and compel NGOs to join a Congress after their registration with the Board. The 
constitutional requirement that an exception to the rule must fall under one of the stated 
exceptions under the constitution has not been met. Barring all these, it has to be 
determined whether compelling NGOs to constitute a forum under the law is reasonably 
necessary in a democratic society. In the TMC case the court reiterated that:  
 
…the exceptions to freedom of association are to be construed 
strictly and only convincing and compelling reasons can justify 
restrictions on that freedom. Any interference must correspond to a 
‘pressing social need’; thus, the notion ‘necessary’ does not have the 
flexibility of such expressions as ‘useful’ or ‘desirable’. Thus to be 
called a necessary restriction on the freedom of association in a 
democratic society the limitation must address a pressing social 
need and must not merely be useful or desirable. 
 
 The Congress is constituted for the purposes of adopting a code of conduct.26 The 
code of conduct, the final product of Congress for which reason NGOs are compelled to 
form Congress, is subject to approval by the registration Board.27 Although establishing 
codes to govern the conduct of NGOs is a good and progressive thing to do, it is however 
not necessary to burden the freedom of association under the constitution with such 
requirements. This is because when an application for registration is filed with the Board, 
the applicant is required to file a constitution and is required to enumerate its objects and 
purposes.28 This serves as a good guide for the conduct of the activities of the NGO. The 
NGO is also bound by the general laws of the land, breach of which is saddled with dire 
consequences. A code of conduct may be useful and desirable but it is not necessary to 
burden the freedom to associate with such a requirement, especially when the end product 
is subject to the approval of the Board. The Board by itself can develop a model code of 
conduct to guide the affairs of NGOs in consonance with its responsibility to develop policy 
guidelines for harmonizing activities of NGOs in Zambia.29 It has authority to constitute a 
committee of experts to produce a document like a model code of conduct. A very good best 
practice in the field of regulating NGOs is the Non-Profit Organization Act 1997 of South 
Africa, a piece of legislation that shuns the compulsion of registered association to develop 
a code of conduct but rather empowers the Directorate to produce a model constitution for 
                                                          
26 Section 32(2) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
27 Section 32(3) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
28 Section 10(5) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
29 Section 7(i) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
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NGOs, a code of conduct and other documents that may be necessary to guide the affairs of 
NGOs.30 
 The Congress elects a Council which is charged with the duty of facilitating and 
coordinating the work of non-governmental organizations operating in Zambia.31 The 
Congress also has authority to prescribe responsibilities for NGOs operating in Zambia.32 
The list of responsibilities prescribed by the Congress is subject to the approval of the 
Board.33 It is however, clear that the Board is also entrusted with the duty to advise on 
strategies for efficient planning and co-ordination of the activities of NGOs in Zambia.34 It is 
therefore unnecessary to coerce NGOs into a single forum for the purpose of doing the 
same thing.35 Furthermore, Part IV of the NGOs Act provides in an extensive way the duties 
of a registered organization under the law.36 It serves no legitimate purpose to form an 
NGO Council to compile a list of responsibilities subject to the approval of the Board when 
the subject is tackled in a whole part of the law. No legitimate purpose is served by 
duplicating duties, a recipe for creating tension between the NGOs Council and the NGO 
registration Board. Compelling NGOs to belong to a forum fails the validity test and is 
contrary to law. It fails the test because it offers no option for NGOs to leave the forum, 
undermining the freedom to dissociate. It serves no legitimate purpose and is unreasonable 
in a democratic society.  
 
3.2 Powers of the Minister Under the Act 
 
The Minister who has the cabinet responsibility for the administration of the Act, may on 
recommendation of the Board responsible for registering NGOs make regulations for the 
terms and procedure of the Council of NGOs elected by the NGO Congress.37 It is also 
provided under Part V that the members of the Council shall be elected at an annual 
general meeting of the Congress and shall hold office for such period and such terms and 
conditions as the Congress may determine.38 Flowing from these two provisions it is clear 
that the Minister has power to regulate the terms and procedure of the council, while the 
same power to regulate is another breathe given to the NGOs Congress. This presents a 
critical legal problem to be resolved. Perhaps if a conflict arises and the matter is brought 
                                                          
30 NPO Act 1997; s 6 (1) The Directorate must— 
(a) prepare and issue model documents, including— 
(i) model constitutions for nonprofit organizations; and 
(ii) a model of the narrative report to be submitted by registered nonprofit 
organizations to the Directorate; 45 
(b) prepare and issue codes of good practice for—(i) nonprofit organizations; and 
(ii) those persons, bodies and organizations making donations or grants to 
nonprofit organizations. 
31 Section 30(3), 31(2) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
32 Section 32(4) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
33 Section 32(4) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
34 Section 7(j) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
35 Section 7 of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
36 Section 25-28 of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
37 Section 37 of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
38 Section 30(3) of Non-Governmental Organization Act 2009. 
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before court then the court will put to rest the tension created by the law. As it stands and 
in light of the purposes of the law it must be scrutinized to ascertain whether it can 
withstand the constitutional validity test. If the minister’s power is maintained as it is 
currently stipulated in the Act, the minister has authority to appoint members of the NGO 
Board and unfettered discretion to approve or reject nominations from other agencies to 
the Board. The minister has power to set term limits for the NGO council, an elected body of 
the NGO congress. The code of conduct and list of responsibilities must all be approved by 
the Board appointed by the Minister. The minster also has power on the recommendation 
of the Board to make a statutory instrument for the better carrying out of the law. It goes 
without saying that the Minister wields absolute power and extensive influence on the 
Board and has unfettered discretion to interfere in the work of the NGO Council, and 
consequently Congress.  
The Board is subject to control by the Minister in all its dealings. Thus even though 
the minister is not a member of the Council or Congress, he has authority to set the term 
limit and procedure of the Council and through the Board appointed by him approve their 
code of conduct and any other significant things done by the NGOs. Article 6 (3) provides 
that the Board shall comprise: two members appointed by the Minister, one person each 
from the Ministries of Health, Home Affairs, Economic Planning, Community Development, 
Local Government, Attorney’s General’s office, and seven members elected by the Congress. 
Apart from the fact that the majority of the members of the Board are Government officials, 
nothing is left to chance to ensure that the Government majority is not threatened and 
consequently article 6 (3) provides that the Minister shall, on receiving the names of the 
proposed representatives, consider the nominations and may reject any nomination. Never 
mind that the organization is allowed to make another nomination, that too can be rejected 
by the Minister presumably until the organization comes up with a name to the liking of the 
Minister. Institutional effectiveness and accountability are central to good governance and 
the rule of law. They require independent, functional and credible institutions to be 
meaningful checks on governance. A Board appointed by the Minister is a travesty and a 
shameful attempt to institute and legitimize a Board without the slightest integrity. Under 
the Act the Minister and the Government are the de facto board. 
Freedom of association means freedom without interference by the state. It is not 
likely non-interference can be achieved given the powers of the minister under the law and 
no legitimate reason is provided for allowing a non-member of the NGO council to have 
authority to dictate the term limit and the procedure of the council. In New Patriotic Party 
V. Attorney-General supra, the Ghanaian Supreme Court held in relation to governmental 
interference as follows:  
 
Since under sections 6 of PNDCL 312 it was the minister who 
appoints, inter alia, the executive secretary who was responsible for 
the day to day administration of the business of the council; and 
under section 13 it was the minister who by legislative instrument 
would make regulations for the effective implementation of the Law, 
the minister had in effect almost absolute control of the council. Thus 
the function of the council under section 3(b) of PNDCL 312 to 
monitor the operations of the registered associations would 
necessarily involve and result in interfering in its affairs by the 
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minister who was not a member of any of the registered associations 
but was in control of the CIBA council through his representatives 
and appointees. That was violative of articles 21 (e) and 37(2) (a) of 
the Constitution, 1992 regarding the right of freedom of association 
free from interference.  
 
There is nothing democratic about being forced to join an association and elect your 
governing body and then await a non-member to determine their term limits and 
procedure for conducting their affairs. This interference is obscene and totally unjustifiable 
in a democratic state.   
 
3.3 Refusal of Registration 
 
Under the Act, the Board has authority to reject an application for registration, citing a 
variety of broad reasons for its action. The Board may reject an application if the proposed 
activity or the procedures of the organization are not in the public interest. One would wish 
that for the purposes of the Act, public interest would have been defined since the Act was 
made to enhance transparency, accountability and performance of NGOs. Public interest is 
not defined and it is too nebulous a term that can encompass a myriad of reasons to refuse 
registration. It is a term that has proved to be a darling of authoritarian regimes world-
wide. Even more absurd is that under the act the Board can refuse registration of a NGO if 
its internal procedures are according to the Board not in the public interest. Matters of 
internal procedure should not be a reason for denying individuals the freedom of 
association. It is rather too harsh and undesirable in a democracy. Registration should be a 
simple and routine matter not subject to approval by a government official. That is the only 
way to remove the risk that a government official might abuse his or her power in 
determining which organizations should be allowed to exist or not. In the TMC case, the 
government of Azerbaijan had dissolved an NGO because, among other reasons cited, it did 
not comply with its internal procedures for holding a meeting of the organization. The 
European Court of Human Rights held that:  
 
It is clear that, for example, when an association misses its deadline 
for conducting a members’ meeting, it does not create a danger to a 
democratic society, and therefore, there is no necessity to restrict 
the activities of the association in order to preserve the democracy. 
Such a violation of internal governance rules may not be used as the 
basis for involuntary dissolution of an association, such an action is 
an impermissible restriction of the right to freedom of association.  
 
Matters of internal procedures therefore should not of themselves be the basis for refusing 
the registration of an organization. This coupled with the fact that the public interest has 
not been defined, the danger that it may be used to limit the enjoyment of the freedom is 
glaring. 
 The Board has authority to refuse registration when it is satisfied on the 
recommendation of the Council of NGOs that an application should not be approved. This 
means that other NGOs have power to oppose the registration of another association and 
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may do this by a recommendation to the Board. This is deeply worrying. If an NGO sees a 
new entrant to the market as a threat to its operations, or for some other reason, it may 
convince the Council to make a recommendation to the Board to refuse registration. This 
undoubtedly is a violation of the NGOs freedom of association. The state is constitutionally 
bound to ensure that individuals under its jurisdiction enjoy the rights articulated in the 
constitution. Its failure to do so is a violation of the NGOs’ rights. The quality of law 
requirement is not met under these circumstances because the law does not provide 
sufficient safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness by the NGO Council and the Board. 
The Law must spell out the scope of the discretion and how it is to be exercised and must 
give sufficient indication of what practices or conduct will trigger the NGO council 
recommendation to the Board.39 In the absence of this safeguard government officials will 
interfere in the enjoyment of the freedom with their unfettered discretion by arbitrarily 
refusing registration. Further, the Board may refuse the registration of an association if it 
feels that the name of the association is repugnant or otherwise undesirable. No 
benchmarks are provided for exercising this power. It gives a wide discretion to the Board 
and can be used to frustrate the freedom of association. 
 
3.4 Suspension and Cancellation of Certificate 
 
The Board has authority to suspend or cancel the certificate of an organization if the NGO 
Council recommends the suspension or cancellation of the certificate (17 (1) (f). The 
section in in 17 (3) attempts to give the NGO whose certificate is to be cancelled an 
opportunity to submit reasons why the NGO should not be suspended or have its certificate 
suspended. This procedural requirement is worthless as there are no strict and clear 
guidelines as to the grounds upon which the NGO Council may exercise this power in a 
clear, predictable and objective manner. Thus the NGO Council has wide discretion to do 
whatever it wants when it comes to who gets suspended or whose license gets cancelled. 
This is a threat to any meaningful enjoyment of the freedom of association. It is surprising 
that this provision is included in the Act especially when the Board has unquestionable 
broad powers over the life and death of registered NGOs. It vets their constitutions, vets 
their reports, checks who is managing and mismanaging funds, and approves the codes of 
conduct of associations. Giving this power to the Council is oppressive since the Council is 
not a regulatory body properly so called, but rather a body elected by the associations 
themselves. This gives power to a body the qualifications of whose members are not 
specified anywhere in the Act and are not subject to the requirements for appointment as is 
the case with the Board, yet they wield authority to recommend suspension of NGOs to the 
Board.  It appears that the Board will have no discretion to refuse to follow the 
recommendations of the Council since none is provided for under the law. 
 The Board may also suspend or cancel the certificate of an association if the 
organization alters its objects or pursues other objects than its declared objects. Thus if an 
association is established for the promotion of human rights and it conducts charity or 
development operations the association has breached a cardinal rule and its certificate 
could conceivably be suspended or cancelled. This does not sit well with good reason, 
                                                          
39 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 2000‑XI). 
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especially when NGOs have no shareholders. So long as the activities undertaken by 
association are not illegal, contrary to the laws of Zambia and not inimical to the national 
security, no legitimate aims are achieved by shutting it down. There should be no need to 
cancel the certification of organizations on such broad terms. Besides, involuntary 
termination or dissolution of NGOs must meet the applicable standards and the relevant 
government official exercising such power must be guided by objective standards and 
restricted from arbitrary decision-making.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In our view the NGO Act is unconstitutional under the 1996 Zambian constitution. It also 
violated international human rights norms relating to the freedom of expression. It without 
doubt belongs to the pre-democratization era and completely fails to see NGOs as partners 
in the good governance project. The attempt by the Act in its introduction to justify and 
legitimize the obstacles it is placing for NGO operations, as necessary to enhance 
accountability and transparency of NGOs, to harmonize or coordinate the NGOs’ activities 
and to meet national interest are mere rationalizations for repression and are violations of 
international laws and conventions to which Zambia is a signatory. Government must 
strive to promote freedom of association and a robust civil society, independent of state 
control or government involvement, since it is a necessary and important ingredient in a 
functioning democracy. It must give NGOs an enabling environment for them to operate 
effectively. Where it is necessary to restrict the rights of citizens, the interference must be 
made in accordance with the constitution, must pursue a legitimate aim necessary in a 
democratic society and the measures taken must be proportional to the legitimate aims 
sought to be achieved. While the NGO Act of 2009 is not a model in clarity of drafting, it is 
clearly riddled with provisions that are designed to facilitate interference with the 
enjoyment of the freedom of association. In its current form it has no place in a democratic 
society. The Government should immediately repeal the law due to its lack of compliance 
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